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Court of Appeal
Intoxication and Diminished Responsibility
R v Hendy [2006] 2 Cr App R 33
On the night of 25 February 1992 the appellant killed a stranger in an
alleyway in Bristol. The appellant used a sheath knife to stab the victim
18 times in an unprovoked attack. He had consumed whisky, vodka and
sherry at a party not more than two hours before the incident. He
admitted to the killing and raised the defence of diminished responsibil-
ity at his trial under s. 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957. Three consultant
forensic psychiatrists for the appellant submitted that he was suffering
from a psychopathic disorder. Evidence for the Crown contended that
the appellant simply had behavioural problems, but the question of
whether the appellant’s loss of temper would constitute an abnormal
state of mind or simply an inability to control his behaviour was compli-
cated by the fact that he had taken a considerable quantity of alcohol on
the night of the offence. The trial judge directed the jury by reference to
the following questions which derived from a commentary by the late
Professor Sir John Smith ([1984] Crim LR 554) on R v Gittens [1984]
3 All ER 252, and had been approved by the Court of Appeal in R v
Atkinson [1985] Crim LR 314 and R v Egan (1992) 95 Cr App R 278:
Q1. Have the defence satisfied you that it is more likely than not if the
defendant had not taken drink he would have killed as he in fact did? If the
answer is ‘no’, the verdict is ‘guilty of murder’. If the answer is ‘yes’,
proceed to question 2. 
Q2. Have the defence satisfied you that it is more likely than not that if the
defendant had not taken drink he would have been under diminished
responsibility when he killed? If the answer is ‘no’, the verdict is ‘guilty
of murder’. If the answer is ‘yes’, the verdict is ‘not guilty of murder, but
guilty of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility’. (formatting
added)
The appellant was convicted of murder. On appeal against conviction, he
argued that the trial judge’s directions misstated the law as explained in
R v Dietschmann [2003] 1 All ER 897, (2003) 67 JCL 395, which held that
the questions proposed by Professor Smith did not correspond with the
correct authority of Gittens. The Crown conceded that whilst this was
correct, the directions accorded with the law as it was understood at the
time of the trial when R v Atkinson [1985] Crim LR 314 and R v Egan
(1992) 95 Cr App R 278 considered the questions to be good law, and
thus a misdirection could not avail the defendant.
HELD, ALLOWING THE APPEAL, the law had been correctly stated in
Gittens above. Alcohol and drugs were not to be viewed as inherent
causes of an abnormality of mind for the purposes of s. 2(1) of the 1957
Act, and the Court of Appeal in Atkinson and Egan above had wrongly
approved the questions posed by Professor Smith. The law explained in
Dietschmann was not ‘new law’ but merely confirmation that Gittens had
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always been the correct authority. The trial judge’s direction was there-
fore unsafe and the appellant’s conviction for murder was quashed and
a conviction for manslaughter was substituted.
COMMENTARY
Lord Hutton in Dietschmann temporarily laid to rest the problematic
question of whether intoxication, as opposed to the disease of alcohol-
ism which was confirmed to come under the ambit of s. 2(1) of the 1957
Act as a result of R v Tandy [1989] 1 All ER 267, should be considered by
a jury when a defendant raises the defence of diminished responsibility.
His direction guided the members of the jury to ask themselves: 
. . . has the defendant satisfied you that, despite the drink, his mental
abnormality substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his fatal
acts ([2003] 1 All ER 897 at 913).
By stating ‘despite the drink’, Lord Hutton separated intoxication from
diminished responsibility, thus adding some much needed clarity to this
area of the law. This direction upholds Gittens in which Lord Lane CJ
stated that the jury should be directed to disregard the effect of the
alcohol or drugs on the defendant.
The relevant defence in s. 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 reads as
follows:
where a person kills, he shall not be convicted of murder if he was suffering
from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from any inherent causes
or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental
responsibility for his acts in doing the killing.
The Court of Appeal decision in Gittens is to be applauded for its no-
nonsense approach to intoxicated diminished responsibility. Lord Lane
CJ clearly stated that an abnormality of mind induced by alcohol or
drugs is not due to inherent causes and is not within s. 2(1). This would
seem right. One can only imagine the chaos in the courts if intoxication
was to be considered as an inherent cause of an abnormality of mind.
Professor Smith in his commentary on the Gittens case noted that if a jury
were asked to ignore the effect of drink and drugs but nevertheless
believed that the killing would not have taken place in the absence of
such intoxicants, they logically had to answer two hypothetical ques-
tions: have the defence satisfied you on the balance of probabilities—
that, if the defendant had not taken drink: (1) he would have killed as he
in fact did? And (2) he would have been under diminished responsibility
when he did so? Lord Lane CJ in Atkinson expressly welcomed Professor
Smith’s directions as clear and understood by all. The trend continued in
Egan, when in response to the appellant’s argument that Professor
Smith’s tests were irreconcilable with the ratio in Gittens, Watkins LJ
ruled that not only should the tests be applied generally, but it was
astonishing to think that the court in Atkinson did not have the Gittens
ratio in mind when approving the questions.
But does this leave us with a logical test? By answering ‘no’ to the first
question ‘have the defence satisfied you that if the defendant had not
taken drink, he would have killed as he in fact did?’, it is assumed that
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no other factors apart from the consumed intoxicants contributed to the
diminished responsibility of the defendant at the time of the killing. It
seems strange that the Court of Appeal did not notice this inconsistency
earlier. Will not the effect of alcohol exacerbate the inherent cause
rather than cancel it out? This may especially be the case if the inherent
cause is psychological (R v Lloyd Sanderson [1994] 98 Cr App R 325) as
opposed to a disease (Tandy). Once ‘no’ is answered to question 1, the
defendant cannot then reach question 2, which asks if he was suffering
from a diminished responsibility at the time of the offence. Sullivan in
his commentary on Egan condemns these tests as placing a restrictive
gloss on s. 2, suggesting that a jury should instead be asked if they are
satisfied that if D had killed in the same circumstances but in a sober
state his responsibility would have been substantially impaired (see G. R.
Sullivan, ‘Intoxicants and Diminished Responsibility’ [1994] Crim LR
156–62 at 160). Lord Hutton in Dietschmann eventually noticed the
inconsistencies by stating ([2003] 1 All ER 897 at 910):
the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in R v Atkinson in applying
Professor Smith’s two questions was erroneous and that the judgment in
that case cannot be reconciled with the judgment in R v Gittens, which, in
my opinion, states the law correctly.
Thus, Professor Smith’s two questions had not taken full account of
the valuable ratio in Gittens, which recommended a consideration of all
other factors within s. 2(1). Therefore, if the answer to the first question
is ‘no’, the defence should still be available. The clarification of the law
in Dietschmann mirrors a recent development in the law of provocation,
partially governed by s. 3 of the 1957 Act. R v Mohammed (Faqir) [2005]
EWCA Crim 1880, (2006) 70 JCL 121 and R v James; Karimi [2006] 1 All
ER 759, (2006) 70 JCL 203, preferred the Privy Council decision of
Attorney-General for Jersey v Holley [2005] UKPC 23, (2006) 70 JCL 23
when it held that provocation is to be judged against a ‘one standard
reasonable man’ as the 1957 Act had intended, rejecting a wide range of
characteristics which inevitably vary from defendant to defendant.
Thus, the disease of alcoholism is to be considered as a response charac-
teristic, but ‘just being drunk’ is not relevant in relation to provocation.
This clampdown under s. 3 ends the overlap between s. 2(1) and s. 3 in
relation to what were once ‘shared’ characteristics such as depressive
illnesses, which, in the absence of a taunt directed towards the illness,
can now only be relevant under the ambit of s. 2(1). Professor Smith
suggested a much better alternative in his later commentary on Dietsch-
mann (see [2002] Crim LR 132) that if the jury is satisfied on the balance
of probabilities that an abnormality existed and played such a part in D’s
actions as substantially to diminish his mental responsibility for those
acts, they will find him not guilty of murder. Lord Hutton commended
this direction when laying down the new test in the final Dietschmann
appeal. With the present case affirming this, it would seem logical and
appropriate that alcohol were removed from the test altogether. Alco-
holism has found its way into s. 2(1) of the 1957 Act through Tandy.
Watkins LJ in the Court of Appeal held that a craving for drink to
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amount to an abnormality of mind must be such as to render the
accused’s use of drink or drugs involuntary so as to grossly impair
judgment and emotional responses and substantially impair mental
responsibility. Controversially, the first drink has to be involuntary for
alcoholism to be considered a disease, and Tandy requires a total inability
to resist an impulse to drink in order to raise a defence under s. 2(1).
Does not the nature of diminished responsibility require some responsi-
bility to be retained? This firm approach is, however, correct. It is not
favourable to consider general alcohol consumption as an inherent
cause of a disease, and so understandably the effect of the intoxicants on
the defendant’s mind must be extreme to come under the ambit of
s. 2(1). Can it also be argued that alcoholism does not have to be a
‘disease’ but merely an extreme craving impairing judgment? Professor
Smith reflected upon this issue in his commentary on Tandy ([1988]
Crim LR 308), where he noted that if the effect of the alcohol upon the
defendant’s mind is such that judgment is so impaired that his mental
responsibility for that act is diminished, this must equally be so whether
the first drink was taken voluntarily or involuntarily. The mental abnor-
mality at the time of the act would be the same. This strict test is not as
watertight as it first seems and in the future it will no doubt be weak-
ened by drunken defendants who wish to raise a defence under
s. 2(1).
Lord Hutton made some noteworthy remarks in Dietschmann, which
were supported in the present case. The ambit of s. 2(1) was interpreted
broadly by Lord Hutton when he said ([2003] 1 All ER 897 at 909): 
the defendant’s drinking is to be left out of account in so far as it exacer-
bated his abnormality of mind. But, alcohol can have a disinhibiting effect
and can lead to violence in person who does not suffer from an abnormality
of mind within the meaning of s. 2(1), and the jury can take this into
account in deciding whether the defendant’s underlying mental abnormal-
ity did substantially impair his mental responsibility notwithstanding the
drink he had taken.
There is some confusion here. Why is a jury encouraged to take into
account the effect of alcohol on a normal person when it is dealing with
an ‘abnormal’ defendant under s. 2(1) notwithstanding alcohol? In
following Gittens and Tandy, it is submitted that the effect of alcohol
should not be considered when not linked to an abnormality of mind
induced by disease under s. 2(1). Lord Hutton also claims that ‘sub-
stantial impairment of mental responsibility’ within s. 2(1) does not
require an abnormality of mind to be the sole cause of the defendant’s
acts. ‘Substantial’ was suggested in R v Lloyd [1966] 1 All ER 107 to
mean more than trivial but less than total. Therefore the impairment
simply need not be total; it is certainly not an invitation to conclude that
factors outside arrested and retarded development and inherent causes
induced by disease or injury are included in the definition. Lord Hutton
misdirected himself and may have drawn the potential causes of dimin-
ished responsibility too widely for a jury to comprehend, but Gage LJ
supported this statement in the present case (at [29–33]). If it was not for
Lord Hutton’s future suggestion including the phrase ‘despite the drink’
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([2003] 1 All ER 897 at 913, see above), alcohol at any level of consump-
tion could clearly be a factor contributing to an abnormality of mind. A
further cause for concern is Lord Hutton’s analysis of Gittens. He took the
following two points from Gittens:
(i) the abnormality of mind and the effect of the drink may each play a
part in impairing the defendant’s mental responsibility for the killing;
(ii) it is not correct for the judge to direct the jury that unless they are
satisfied that if the defendant had not taken drink he would have
killed, the defence of diminished responsibility must fail. ([2003] 1 All
ER 897 at 907–8).
There are some problems with this analysis. First, Gittens did not rule
that both the abnormality of mind and the effect of the drink may each
play a part in the mental responsibility for the killing. The trial judge in
Gittens—taking a direction from R v Turnbull (1977) 65 Cr App R
242—directed the jury to decide what the substantial cause of the
defendant’s abnormality was, the inherent abnormality on one side and
the alcohol on the other. The trial judge’s direction was held to be
incorrect by the Court of Appeal. The reasons given by Lord Lane CJ
were as follows:
we doubt whether in any circumstances it is proper to invite the jury to
decide the question of diminished responsibility solely on the basis of ‘what
was the substantial cause of the defendant’s behaviour?’ However there is
no doubt that in the instant case the jury might and probably would
conclude that both drink and also inherent causes played their part in the
abnormality of mind (at 256).
This part of the judgment has been misinterpreted. Lord Lane CJ is not
declaring that an abnormality of mind together with alcohol both play a
part in the responsibility for the killing, and he is certainly not suggesting
this as a future direction. He is merely commenting on the individual
facts of the Gittens case. His comments can be construed as simply
noticing that a jury may sometimes consider alcohol to have played a
part in impairing the defendant’s responsibility, but he then goes on to
assert in the ratio that this consideration must be removed as it is
completely irrelevant to the applicable section. Lord Hutton’s point (ii)
relates to Professor Smith’s questions and it is correct. However, Lord
Hutton’s interpretation of why these tests were expelled from the law
suggests that they failed to recognise that the abnormality of mind
arising from a cause specified in the subsection and the effect of the
drink may each play a part in impairing the defendant’s mental respons-
ibility. The first reading of Lord Hutton’s analysis at point (ii) is that
drink is an outside factor and not part of s. 2(1). Secondly, by announcing
that the problematic directions were abolished because they failed to
recognise both factors in s. 2(1) and the effect of alcohol on a defendant’s
impaired responsibility, Lord Hutton is implying here that a correct test
should take into account both of these attributes. It is submitted that
alcohol should be taken out of the equation completely. This would
correspond with the recent changes in the law on provocation, which—
aside from the disease of alcoholism—reject aggravating factors such as
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simply being drunk to secure a defence under s. 3. Furthermore, this
was not the problem with the tests. It is submitted that the problem
with the directions was that they failed to recognise that the real
question was whether an abnormality of mind arising from a cause
specified in the subsection impaired the defendant’s mental responsibil-
ity for the killing.
We are left with an unsatisfactory reliance on ‘voluntariness’ as to
whether alcoholism for the purposes of s. 2(1) is a ‘disease’. Will the law
eventually loosen to allow voluntary but very heavy drinkers to raise
diminished responsibility? Lord Hutton’s obiter remarks concerning
alcohol as not only a consideration for the jury, but as a potential cause
of an abnormality leading to diminished responsibility, may be taken
seriously in a future case. In the light of the present case, will Gittens
remain authorative?
Lisa Cherkassky
Evidence: Relevance; Bad Character
R v T (AB) [2006] EWCA Crim 2006, [2007] 1 Cr App R 4
The appellant was convicted of two counts of indecent assault against his
seven-year-old niece. The child had alleged that her uncle (the appel-
lant), her grandfather and her step-grandfather had all sexually abused
her. The grandfather was interviewed and admitted the offences. He
died before the matter reached court. The step-grandfather also ad-
mitted the offences and later pleaded guilty. The appellant had denied
the allegations. The prosecution were permitted to admit into evidence
the contents of the late grandfather’s statement and the trial judge ruled
that the statement was relevant and probative. The trial judge also ruled
that, balancing probative value against prejudice, evidence of the step-
grandfather’s conviction was also admissible.
HELD, ALLOWING THE APPEAL, the general principle was that for
evidence to be admissible as relevant it must be logically probative of a
fact in issue between the parties. The fact that two other members of the
complainant’s family admitted sexual abuse of the complainant could
not be relevant, in itself, to the issue of whether or not the appellant had
abused her. The only legitimate purpose that such evidence could serve
would be to establish that the complainant had told the truth in relation
to the other family members, but it could not be probative of the facts
alleged against the appellant. A retrial was ordered.
COMMENTARY
Relevance
Relevant evidence is evidence which has probative value in assisting the
court or jury in its determination of the facts in issue because it renders
The Journal of Criminal Law
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the existence of the facts in issue more or less probable. In order to
receive evidence the court must be satisfied that it is relevant to some
fact in issue which is a proper object of proof in the proceedings and if
evidence is considered irrelevant, it is inadmissible.
In DPP v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729, Lord Simon of Glaisdale stated (at
756):
Evidence is relevant if it is logically probative or disprobative of some
matter which requires proof . . . [R]elevant (i.e. logically probative or
disprobative) evidence is evidence which makes the matter which requires
proof more or less probable.
Is the admitted sexual abuse of the complainant by the other two
family members relevant to an issue at the trial of the uncle? It is
submitted that the correct answer is ‘no’. Abuse by other family mem-
bers (the two grandfathers) does not, as a matter of logic, make it more
or less likely that the complainant was abused independently by the uncle.
The conclusion might well be different if it were established that the
grandfathers and the uncle had been acting in concert, but that was not
the case. In this sense then, the disputed evidence seems to be irrelevant.
The court also stated that the evidence was irrelevant to the complain-
ant’s credibility as a witness, likening any such argument to a form of
‘oath helping’. This, it is submitted, is too harsh. Although there is no
indication in the present case that the credibility of the witness was
directly in issue at the trial, if such an issue were to arise then the
relevance of the disputed evidence becomes more apparent. If, for
example, it were alleged that the complainant had fabricated the allega-
tions against her uncle, surely the fact that she had, on two earlier
occasions, been found to be providing truthful accounts of abuse by
family members, makes it more likely that her present account is truth-
ful and relevant.
Non-defendant’s bad character and hearsay
The prosecution had relied, inter alia, upon ss 114 and 116 of the
Criminal Justice Act 2003 as a means of securing admission of the
disputed evidence, but as the court found the material irrelevant, then
no further issue relating to admissibility arose.
Although not raised at trial, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that
the disputed evidence might have been admissible by virtue of s. 100 of
the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Evidence of the bad character of a person
other than the defendant is admissible if it is ‘important explanatory
evidence’. It is ‘important explanatory evidence’ if the court or jury
would find it impossible or difficult to understand other evidence in the
case without it and its value for understanding the case as a whole is
substantial (s. 100(2)). However, s. 100 only regulates the admissibility
of evidence of bad character which is defined in s. 98 as:
evidence of, or of a disposition towards, misconduct on his part, other than
evidence which has to do with the alleged facts of the offence with which
the defendant is charged . . .
Evidence: Relevance; Bad Character
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It is at least arguable that evidence of abuse carried out by members of
the same family on the child complainant is evidence which has to do
with the alleged facts of the offence with which the defendant is charged
and therefore outside the scope of s. 98 and s. 100.
Simon Cooper
The Journal of Criminal Law
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